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ABSTRACT 
 
BANKING AND FINANCE IN ARGENTINA IN THE PERIOD 1900-35 
 
Leonard Nakamura 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
 
Carlos E. J. M. Zarazaga 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 
 
From 1900 to 1935, Argentina evolved from an economy highly dependent on external, 
primarily British, finance to one more nearly self-sufficient.   We examine the failure of 
domestic finance to adequately fill the void left by the decline of London and the breakdown of 
the world financial system in the interwar period, when neither the Buenos Aires Bolsa nor the 
private domestic banks developed rapidly enough to fully replace British investors as efficient 
channels for financing private investment.  One consequence is that Argentine investable funds 
were increasingly concentrated in a single institution, the Banco de la Nacion Argentina (BNA), 
creating a lopsided financial structure that was vulnerable to rent seeking and to authoritarian 
capture. Nevertheless, several measures, including gold reserves, interest rates, money supply, 
bank credit, and the market capitalization of domestic corporations, attest to the very high level 
of financial development achieved by Argentina. 
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Globalization and financial openness were defining themes of the world economy in the 
last decade of the 20
th century, much as they were in the first decade.  Indeed, from 1900 to 
1913, international financial flows in relationship to the size of the world economy were larger 
than they are today.   
  In the wake of the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, however, economists and 
policymakers have been questioning the value of the unhindered flow of international finance.  
In particular, some have argued that such financial flows can destabilize domestic economies, as 
overseas investors rush into emerging markets and as quickly rush out, exacerbating both booms 
and downturns.   
  This article focuses on a crucial stage in Argentine financial development, the period 
from 1900 to 1935, as Argentina evolved from an economy highly dependent on external, 
primarily British, finance to one more nearly self-sufficient.  This period permits a detailed case 
study of the consequences, for one country that was highly dependent on foreign finance, of the 
breakdown in the international financial system.  Moreover, at least since Taylor’s seminal paper 
(1992), this has been an important area of research for Argentina, so that data and analyses are, 
while still incomplete, comparatively well developed. We thus are able to build on the work of 
Taylor (1992), della Paolera and Taylor (1998, 1999), and Nakamura and Zarazaga (1998), to 
examine the failure of domestic finance to adequately fill the void left by the decline of London 
and the breakdown of the gold standard world financial system in the interwar period.  In 
 2addition, we extend the statistical series on the Buenos Aires Bolsa in Nakamura and Zarazaga 
with data from 1931 to 1935.   
  The story that we tell is one in which neither the Buenos Aires Bolsa nor the private 
domestic banks developed rapidly enough to fully replace the British investors as efficient 
channels for financing private investment.  One consequence is that Argentine investable funds 
were increasingly concentrated in a single institution, the Banco de la Nacion Argentina (BNA), 
creating a lopsided financial structure that was vulnerable to rent seeking and to authoritarian 
capture.  Despite this weakness, we should remain aware of the very impressive level of 
development that Argentina did achieve during this period.  Several measures, including gold 
reserves, interest rates, money supply, bank credit, and the market capitalization of domestic 
corporations, attest to the vibrancy of Argentine financial development. 
  In his pathbreaking article, Taylor (1992) used the example of Argentine economic 
divergence from the mainstream to argue that Argentina’s financial dependence on Great Britain 
in the early years of the century was a counterexample to the notion that foreign investment can 
jump-start prosperity.  He showed that Argentine financial dependence and its demographic 
profile made it vulnerable to the decline of British financial leadership.  Della Paolera and Taylor 
(1998, 1999) pointedly analyze the decline of private banking relative to the quasi-public Banco 
de la Nacion Argentina as a crucial element in the failure of Argentina’s response to the 
challenge of British financial decline.   
In the international arena, financial leadership after the Belle Epoque passed from 
London to New York. This decline not only tended to raise world interest rates, favoring savers 
over borrowers, but it also deprived Argentina of the benefit of British knowledge of Argentine 
economic investment opportunities.  Nakamura and Zarazaga (1998) and Taylor (2000) 
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Argentina was not, as an aggregate, deprived of access to international finance. 
 But in a period of creative destruction such as occurred in the early decades of the 
century, the ability of financial intermediaries to make fine-grained determinations about capital 
allocation can be crucial to the long-run success of economic enterprise. While the United States 
was willing to take over the British role of investing in the official bonds of Argentina and of 
Buenos Aires, and indeed did so at rates below those that would have been on offer in London, it 
did not step into a similar role for direct private investment.  
  A second theme in this paper is thus the development of domestic alternatives to 
international financial investors.  The Buenos Aires Bolsa, domestic private banks, and the BNA 
were all channels for directing domestic savings into private investment.  Of the three, as we 
shall see, only the BNA was able to rise in importance over the entire course of the period we 
investigate.  As a quasi-public entity, the BNA was in a strong position to provide inside money 
to the Argentine economy, but it was probably not nearly as appropriate a provider of  private 
investment finance. 
  Indeed, a recurrent question in economics has been the relative economic importance of 
the two sides of the banking ledger – loans on the asset side and deposits on the liability side.  A 
long tradition of monetarism has focused on the importance of the stability of the growth of the 
money stock as a key determinant of the efficiency of economic regimes (for example, Friedman 
and Schwartz, 1963.)  From this perspective, the liability side of the banking ledger is of key 
macroeconomic significance.  On the other hand, at least since Bagehot (1920) and Schumpeter 
(1934), economists have argued that the allocation of business finance has been a key 
 4contribution of the development of the banking system, thereby emphasizing the asset side of the 
banking ledger.   
  The policy relevance of this issue has risen rather than diminished over the years, as 
economic theory has come to play an ever more decisive role in debates over public policy.  For 
example, if monetary and price stability are crucial prerequisites of development, and problems 
of credibility and intertemporal consistency of behavior are paramount, then the development of 
a regime such as adherence to a gold standard, a currency board, or dollarization may cut through 
knotty problems of institutional development.  But if the efficient allocation of private finance is 
seen to be crucial to economic growth, then the development of legal and financial institutions 
that encourage the growth of private monitoring intermediaries like commercial banks and 
liquidity-enhancing markets like stock exchanges cannot be short-circuited.   
In this paper, we seek to discuss Argentine financial development as seen through the 
lens of its stock market, by examining in some detail the monthly stock returns of the banking 
and nonbanking sectors of Argentina, as well as examining some basic banking balance-sheet 
data.   
One motivation to following stock returns is that they are less subject to the serious 
measurement and methodological issues that arise on the reconstruction of the national accounts 
of the time and which seem to have blurred the debate with potentially conflicting stories.
1 
  Perhaps more important, a look at the relative valuation of stocks in different sectors of 
the economy may provide some useful insights into the microeconomic details of the 
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1 For instance, according to the internationally comparable figures compiled by Maddison (1995), the 
hopes that Argentina would resume the fast 3 percent annual growth rate in per capita terms that the country had 
experienced in the period 1900-13 did materialize, since the equivalent growth rate for the period 1918-1829 was, on 
average, around 4 percent, even higher than before the Great War. By contrast, a recent revision of the national 
accounts of the time by Cortés Conde (1994) suggests that growth did slow down after 1914-18. Argentinean development process that might escape the scrutiny of the usual macroeconomic 
aggregates. 
  Our data show, for example, that the domestic private banking sector of Argentina seems 
to have been struggling even before the Great War, while the industrial sector initiated a steady 
expansion right after it. We argue, in detail, that the banking crisis of 1912-14 played a large role 
in weakening the private banks in Argentina, and that this weakness contributed to the excessive 
development of the quasi-public Bank of the Nation.  In turn, the lopsided development of 
Argentine finance made it vulnerable to the political economic chicanery described in della 
Paolera and Taylor (1999). 
Judging by the behavior of banks’ stock prices and returns, the markets do not seem to 
have been particularly optimistic about the prospects of domestic banks after the Great War, 
perhaps an early warning of the massive bailout that would have to be engineered in 1935, under 
the auspices of the newly founded central bank, with characteristics that, in the view of della 
Paolera and Taylor (1999), are reminiscent of the bailout implemented more recently in East 
Asia, after the 1997-98 crisis. 
It is unclear, however, why financial resources in Argentina were not channeled through 
institutional mechanisms other than banks. Why did the stock market remain relatively small 
during a period of rapid economic expansion? Was the regulatory body regarding corporate 
finance or its legal framework important impediments to a more solid development of 
Argentinean domestic capital markets?  Did the fact that the London Stock Exchange listed the 
most important Argentine issues inhibit the development of the Buenos Aires Bolsa? These are 
urgent questions whose answers remain relevant to today’s economic and financial debates. 
 
 6Section I.  Analytical Framework 
  At least since Schumpeter, economic growth has been associated with financial 
development.  One theoretical strand in the literature has placed the efficient working of 
delegated monitors at the center of our understanding of financial intermediation (Diamond, 
1984, and Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).  In a more nuanced view of the role of banks, private 
banks are privileged as delegated monitors because their crucial role in the transactions 
mechanism gives them a heightened ability to monitor credits (Black, 1975, Fama, 1985).  As 
such, public provision of deposit insurance that protects private banks from destabilizing runs 
may be preferable, despite the moral hazard problems it may engender, to narrow banks that are 
barred from making risky commercial advances. As Mester, et al. (2001) show, commercial 
banks do have access to information from checking accounts that is valuable in monitoring 
borrower activity.   
This “credit” view of banking’s role in development has been emphasized for Argentina 
by della Paolera and Taylor, 1998, in which they point out that private banking was sharply 
curtailed during the crucial decade of the 1920s in the wake of the 1913-14 crisis.  Below, we 
take a modest further step toward the important task of analyzing that crucial crisis.  In 
particular, we point out that the Banco de la Nacion’s quasi-official status may have aided it vis a 
vis private banks that lacked deposit protection.   
  King and Levine (1993) identify bank credit (loans by banks and other deposit-taking 
institutions) and stock turnover rate as key financial variables that measure the ability of a 
financial system to abet the economic development of a country.  Levine and Zervos (1998) use 
bank credit and stock capitalization as indicators. We use these variables to frame a more 
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century. 
  In this paper, we have generally used the United States as our basis for comparison with 
Argentine financial development.  Arguably, the basis for comparison could be other small 
settler countries such as Canada and Australia, rather than the outsized United States.  But Taylor 
(1992) points out that Canada and Australia, also closely tied financially to the London capital 
markets, were also poor performers in the interwar period.  Because the United States, given its 
large size, was naturally more autarchic than other settler countries, it is a potentially more 
telling comparison.   
 
Section II.  The World Capital Market and Argentine Finance 
  During the Belle Epoque, Argentina successfully joined the world on the gold standard 
(Ford, 1962, della Paolera, 1988).  Argentina provided for gold redemption and currency stability 
in the wake of the Baring crisis by setting up two institutions, the Currency Board (Caja de 
Conversion) and the Bank of the Nation (Banco de la Nacion Argentina).  As described in della 
Paolera and Taylor, 1999, the former was responsible for external convertibility and the 
maintenance of the gold standard, while the latter dealt with inside money, engaged in normal 
commercial banking operations, yet also was the state’s bank.  For a substantial period of time, 
these two institutions operated admirably.  Unfortunately, a weakness in the system eventually 
emerged. The BNA – in two steps, first in the banking crisis of 1913-14 and then in the banking 
crisis of 1929 – bailed out bankrupt private domestic banks and, in the process, itself succumbed 
and was folded into the newly created central bank in 1935. 
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world’s gold for a country of its size.  At the end of 1913, the total world stock of gold, 
according to the Economist, cited in Keynes (1930), was 1.579 billion pounds sterling, of which 
965 million pounds was in central banks and treasuries. According to the Economist, the gold 
stock of Argentina, including gold in circulation, was 59 million pounds sterling, of which 55 
million pounds was held in the Caja de Conversion (Caja) and the BNA. Thus Argentina had 
some 3.7 percent of the world’s monetary gold and 5.7 percent of the gold held in the world’s 
central banks and treasuries.  Since, according to Maddison, Argentina’s economy represented 
about 1.2 percent of the world’s output, and 2.8 percent of the world’s exports, these are 
impressive figures.  The figures in the Economist are notable because they represented the facts 
as known to the business community of the time: it was evident to market participants that 
Argentina, at the end of the Belle Epoque, was a considerable figure on world markets.  
Moreover, as World War I began, even more gold entered the country to be held by foreign 
delegations to Argentina.  At the war’s end, foreign legations held 117 million gold pesos (23 
million pounds sterling) in reserves. 
According to Baiocco (1937), in December 1913, the gold reserves in the country (oro 
visible) were 287.39 million gold pesos, with 233.45 in the Caja de Conversion, 32.27 in the 
Banco de la Nacion (that is, the Caja and BNA held the equivalent of 53 million pounds, some 4 
percent less than the Economist’s figure), 18.73 in foreign banks, and a total of 53.94 in banks, 
implying 2.94 in other private banks.  The numbers are close enough: in the first six months of 
1913, 43 million gold pesos had flowed into the Caja, and then 33 million had fled back out in 
the next six; given this instability, a 4 percent “miss” may be attributable to small differences in 
accounting.   
 9But as Table 1, column 4, shows, throughout the period from 1913 to 1928 Argentina 
held an enviable fraction of the world’s gold, one that was more than ample given the size of its 
economy and trade -- almost always between 4 and 6 percent. 
2 Argentina’s ability to maintain a 
substantial horde of gold no doubt bolstered its reputation on world financial markets.   
Table 1, column 1, shows rates of return from long-term Argentine debt instruments, 
primarily the 1886-87 5 percent custom loan regularly quoted on the London stock exchange 
market.
3  This “custom loan” was secured by Argentine custom receipts and was the largest loan 
ever floated abroad by the Argentine government. Columns 2 and 3 show rates of return of 
British consols and on US 20-year corporate bonds. Broadly speaking, world and Argentine 
interest rates were somewhat higher in the period after 1922 than before 1914.  From 1901 to 
1913, the custom loan yielded just under 5.0 percent, and from 1922 to 1928 it yielded an 
identical amount.  (Similarly, in the earlier period the prime rate averaged 6.3 percent and in the 
later 6.9 percent.)  Over the period, the spread between the custom loan and the British consol 
narrowed.   
Thus, while it is evident that there was some upward drift in the real interest rate in 
Argentina, its magnitude appears small and in keeping with changes in the world marketplace, 
rather than suggesting an abrupt change in Buenos Aires’s role therein.  For example, in New 
York, 20-year corporate bonds yielded between 3 1/4 and 4 percent from 1901 to 1913, while 
they yielded between 4 and 5 percent from 1922 to 1929.  Indeed, if anything, we see that the 
British consol rate was drifting higher with respect to long-term rates for US issues, while the 
                                                 
2 These data come from a third source, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s statistics from 1943.  They generally agree with 
Baiocco within about 10 percent.   
3 From 1900 to 1913, della Paolera, (1988), from 1914 to 1919, the Boletin de Bolsa de Commercios, and from June 
1920 to June 1935 (the Economist, last issue in June of each year). For 1931 to 1935, the rate quoted is for the 
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to US dominance of the capital markets appears to have been a relatively smooth one for 
Argentine borrowing, in so far as sovereign, well-secured borrowing is concerned.   
  Moreover, as documented in Taylor (2000) although the risk premium on Argentine debt 
expanded considerably in 1931 and 1932, it narrowed again in 1934 and 1935, with Argentine 
spreads vis a vis US corporate debt being quite low.  This is remarkable given that the gold 
standard has been abandoned all around.  In 1934, the spread between Argentine debt and US 
debt was less than in 1912! 
  On the other hand, it remained the case that international financial flows in the 1920s and 
1930s were much smaller than they had been, as Taylor (2000) also documents.  The question 
that arises is how well domestic financial markets were able to replace these financial flows.  
The aggregate figures argue strongly that Argentine average saving rates were low in the first 
decades of the 20
th century.  But domestic saving is calculated as a residual and thus is subject to 
considerable error.  So while it appears likely that domestic savings were inadequate for 
Argentine economic development, there is value in examining to what extent quantitative 
characteristics of financial institutions in Argentina resemble those in countries with relatively 
well-developed ones.  It is to this task that we now turn, first to the stock market, and then to the 
banking system. 
 
Section III.  Equity Trading on the Buenos Aires Bolsa, 1900-1935 
  This paper documents one step in a long-term project to construct a complete series of 
prices and dividends for all the firms that quoted on the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires  
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Argentine 4 percent rescission loan, maturing in 1952. The rates for the rescission loan and the custom loan are (Buenos Aires stock exchange) in the 20th century.  As of the current time, our data stretches 
from 1900 to 1935.   
  We document the fact that new listings and the overall capitalization of the Bolsa were 
relatively high, compared to gross domestic product, for an emerging market.  However, the 
overall rate of transactions was rather low.  In part, this may be due to the fact that the largest 
Argentine companies, the railroads, were listed on the London stock exchange rather than the 
Bolsa; these shares would naturally have had the highest rate of trading.  A slow rate of turnover 
means that the stock market was less liquid and that the ability of the stock market to attract fresh 
capital to entrepreneurs was weakened.  In addition, a low quantity of transactions means that 
brokerage commissions were also low, with the implication that the Bolsa was not an important 
source of income for equity brokers.  As a result, news and analysis of Argentine equities would 
not have the monetary value that they would have had on a more active exchange. 
  On the other hand, by listing on the London stock exchange the railroads had access to 
large quantities of capital at low rates and were thus able to efficiently finance growth.  As the 
development of the pampas and the port city of Buenos Aires as well as most industry in 
Argentina was the direct beneficiary of railroad development, the tradeoff was no doubt to the 
country’s overall advantage, as Lewis has emphasized.  Moreover, the active attention paid to 
Argentine affairs that the railroads inspired also aided other Argentine issues on the London 
market, like the custom loan.  Thus while the fact that the most important Argentine securities 
traded there has implications for the development of the Buenos Aires Bolsa, it by no means 
suggests that Argentina would have been better off floating them domestically. 
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almost identical in 1929 and 1930, when they are quoted side by side.   Data 
Certainly, the collection of the necessary data for this project has proved to be extremely 
time consuming, suggesting that investors at the time may have faced concerns regarding the 
transparency of corporate governance and the protection of shareholders’ rights. This impression 
is reinforced by the Banco Español scandal uncovered in 1924 (discussed below), an indication 
of a potentially serious failure in supervision and regulation of the banking sector that contributes 
to the picture of East Asia-like features in the early stages of Argentina’s development. 
  Several challenges had to be confronted in this task. The first and more serious one is the 
lack of a single reliable source of data on prices, volumes, and dividends, until the year 1921. 
The data for the period 1900-21 had to be collected, therefore, from a variety of sources, as 
follows: 
Period 1900-05:  
The only source that summarizes monthly data on prices for this period is the Boletín 
Estadístico of the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, issued back then at about the 15
th of each 
month. Only a handful of companies were actively traded each month during this period.  
  Unfortunately, data on dividends and volumes for this period are not systematically 
reported by any source, and it was necessary to reconstruct that information piecemeal from the 
daily summaries of the newspaper La Prensa.  
Even then, information on dividends is generally incomplete. For example, it’s not rare to 
find La Prensa announcing the date of payment of a dividend without mentioning the amount. 
That information had to be supplemented from other sources that occasionally reported annual 
dividends, such as the Anuario Pillado and its successor, the Argentine Yearbook. Combining 
 13these different sources, we are able to reconstruct all the dividends paid by the banks in our stock 
market index in that period, Banco Español del Río de la Plata and Nuevo Banco Italiano.  
Period 1906-13: 
For this period, the Review of the River Plate provided weekly summaries of the prices of 
most companies quoting in the stock market.  We adopted the last price of the last week of each 
month as representative of the monthly prices. 
This source also reports information on annual dividends, although the assigned date is 
that of the end of the fiscal year, rather than the actual date of payment and it misses most of the 
time the payment of provisional dividends. To correct those problems, it was necessary again to 
rely on alternative sources, such as the newspaper La Prensa until 1907 and El Monitor de 
Sociedades Anónimas from that year on. This latter publication provided systematic information 
also on annual dividends for the period 1907-35 and typically contained some references to 
provisional ones, which, in combination with the other sources already mentioned--newspaper 
La Prensa and the Review of the River Plate-- made it possible to determine, at least to a good 
approximation, both the amount and date of payment of provisional dividends. 
Unfortunately, volumes traded for this period were reported only in La Prensa, but it was 
not possible to retrieve them at this stage of the project because of difficulties in the only two 
public libraries of Argentina that have the necessary issues in their collections. 
Period 1913-21: 
Monthly prices were taken from the weekly reports of the Bolsa de Comercio because 
starting in 1913 this source, unlike the Review of the River Plate, reports the exact amount of 
provisional dividends, although not their exact dates, which had to be extracted or inferred from 
the information reported in El Monitor de Sociedades Anónimas. Monthly prices were taken to 
 14be the first price quoted in the report of the first week of the subsequent month or, if that was 
missing, the price of the closest date to the last day of the month in which the stock was traded, 
within a 15-day interval. Volumes traded for this period were also extracted from the Boletín 
Oficial. 
Period 1921-35: 
The Boletín Oficial of the Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires started to report the exact 
dates and amounts of all dividends paid. Therefore, this single source could be used to compile 
the information on prices, volume traded, and dividends. Occasional typos or inconsistencies 
between partial dividends and annual dividends had to be cleared by consulting other sources, 
such as the Review of the River Plate, or El Monitor de Sociedades Anónimas. Monthly prices 
were assigned as in the previous period. 
For all periods, the evolution of prices had to be monitored closely to filter spurious 
changes originated in cosmetic institutional features, such as stock splits or changes in shares’ 
denomination.  In the indexes constructed for this volume, we have limited our indexes to the 
stocks with relatively continuous trading throughout the period.  For these stocks we constructed 
quarterly price indexes, annual average dividend-price ratios and annual total investment returns.  
All these indexes are constructed on the principle used in constructing the Dow Jones index, 
which is share-price weighting.
4   
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4 Our data on market capitalization are not complete for all the years we cover, so consistent market capitalization 
weights are not possible for this entire period.  One natural alternative would be to average rates of return across all 
stocks, therefore giving each stock a weight of one in each period.  However, a chained ratio of growth rates series 
introduces a systematic upward bias into the index.  To give a simple example, suppose an index with only two 
stocks, a and b, valued in years zero and year two at 100 each. In year 1 stock a rises to 150 while stock b falls to 50.  
A share-weighted index would give a price of 100 in each year, while a chained growth rate series would show 100 
in years zero and one, and 133 1/3 in year 2, because it would average a 100 percent increase with a 33 1/3 percent 
decline.    The Market Capitalization of the Bolsa 
The Buenos Aires Bolsa had a market capitalization of roughly 900 million paper pesos 
(p.p.) in 1929, when the GDP was 9.7 billion p.p., so that the market capitalization was 9 percent 
of GDP.  In that same year, the market capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
was $65 billion, when US GNP was $103 billion, or US market capitalization represented over 
60 percent of US GDP.   But the US stock market bubble in 1929 exaggerated the size of the US 
market capitalization with respect to the economy.  For the NYSE, 1924 would perhaps be more 
representative, and in that year, market capitalization was 32 percent of GDP.  To offer another 
comparison, the Italian stock market in 1992 had a capitalization of less than 15 percent of 
Italian GDP. 
Two further points should be noted.  First, the Argentine stock market did not list the 
major railway issues -- the Southern, the Western, the Pacific, and the Central.  Together, the 
Argentine railway issues had a market capitalization in 1929 of 92 million British pounds, 1.1 
billion p.p. at the average exchange rate of that year. If we were to add these issues to the 
Argentine stock market, its capitalization would rise to above 20 percent of GDP. Second, we 
have included only ordinary stock, while the NYSE figures include preferred as well.  
Demurgic-Kunt and Levine (1996) show that for 18 non-OECD countries with formal 
stock exchanges, using data from 1986-1993, the median ratio of market capitalization to GDP 
was 21 percent, which is similar to the capitalization of Argentina’s equity issues, including the 
railway shares, in 1929.  For OECD countries, the ratio was 24 percent. Thus the market value of 
publicly traded Argentine companies, including those listed on the London exchange, was quite 
high, even for a modern economy.  This comparison shows that the market capitalization of the 
Argentine stock market was reasonably substantial for an emerging market.  Although it did not 
 16represent Argentina’s foremost industrial concerns, the railroads, it represented a high proportion 
of the remaining ones and a substantial amount of asset values.   
Turnover on the Bolsa 
Turnover -- the extent to which outstanding shares are actively traded -- varies 
considerably across stock markets and within stock markets over time.  Trading on the Argentine 
Bolsa represented some 5 percent of market capitalization during the 1920s, that is, on average 
only one share in 20 turned over in a given year.  Again, this figure does not include the most 
heavily traded issues, the railroads. In the hectic New York market of the 1920s, trading volume 
sometimes more than equaled the market capitalization.  However, in the 1950s and 1960s, 
trading volume on the NYSE was more like 15 to 20 percent of market capitalization, and today 
it is roughly 50 percent.  In 1992, trading on the Italian stock market was 20 percent of market 
capitalization.  Demirgic-Kunt and Levine present data that show that the trading turnover on 
modern emerging markets (again 1986-93) is about 20 to 25 percent.   
Thus the Argentine Bolsa’s trading rate in the 1920s was relatively slow, either by 
contemporary standards or past ones, but by no means trivial.  While the Bolsa cannot be 
considered highly liquid, it would be a mistake not to take seriously this market as a channel of 
finance.   
Table 2 shows estimates of the volume of transactions in paper pesos on the Argentine 
Bolsa from 1901 to 1907 and 1912 to 1930 for trades in stocks denominated both in paper pesos 
and in gold pesos.
5   In nominal terms, volume peaked in 1918, but just barely.  As a fraction of 
gross domestic product, transactions volume may have peaked as early as 1904. It should be 
noted that the shares of the largest firms on the exchange traded regularly, to the extent that a 
 17trade is recorded in virtually every week for which we have records.  This rate of trade is 
certainly sufficient to provide a reasonable record of valuations.   
The railroads were the highest capitalization companies in the country and would likely 
have been traded very actively on the Bolsa had they been listed there.  The fact that they were 
traded on the London stock exchange meant that the Buenos Aires Bolsa was deprived of trading 
income and stature, and this may have substantially reduced the likelihood that stock trading in 
general would thrive on the Bolsa.  On the other hand, the greater liquidity and legal stature of 
the London stock exchange bolstered the railroads’ ability to raise capital, and also raised the 
value of information about Argentina in London, and information spillovers no doubt helped 
other capital issues there as well.   
New Issues on the Bolsa 
Given the relatively high market capitalization of the companies on the Buenos Aires 
Bolsa, it should not be surprising that new listings on the exchange were substantial.  The paid-in 
capital of these new listings is a good indication of the extent to which equity capital was being 
used to fund industrialization.  Table 2 provides data on the paid-in capital of new listings on the 
Buenos Aires Bolsa, in comparison with some comparable data from the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).   
New listings on the Bolsa, for the directly comparable period 1919 to 1935, show that the 
new listings were about one-third the capitalization of those on the NYSE compared with their 
relative GDPs.  We judge this to be a remarkably high number, particularly considering that the 
NYSE numbers are boosted considerably by the high numbers of 1928 and 1929, a period 
generally regarded as being a classic example of a stock market bubble.   
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5 The comparable data in Nakamura and Zarazaga, 1998, show only the trading in shares denominated in paper As a proportion of gross domestic product, new listings on the Argentine Bolsa peak – at 
least for the periods when we have data – in 1910.  But initial offerings generally remain robust 
until the early 1920s  on average, between 1907 and 1923, they are 0.56 percent of gross 
domestic product, about the average for the NYSE if we omit the bubble years of 1928 and 1929.   
The decline in new offerings after 1923 – no single year reaches 0.4 percent of GDP  is 
associated with the lack of forward momentum in the pace of transactions in the Bolsa. As 
shown in Table 2, transactions on the Bolsa after 1923 are also about half of what they were 
before. Thus while causation no doubt runs both ways, the fact that the liquidity of shares on the 
Bolsa is not improving reduces the incentive of firms to list issues, and underscores the weakness 
of the Bolsa as an instrument for new funds. 
In particular, despite the rise in the number of listings on the Bolsa, the ability of the rate 
of transactions to support new brokers and other sources of additional business information was 
not expanding.  On the contrary, it appears that arbitrage opportunities may well have been 
declining, reducing the information flow from the stock exchange to the rest of the economy. 
The importance of the downward trend in new offerings can be illustrated by the 
following calculation.  Suppose new offerings had continued at a rate of 0.6 percent of GDP 
from 1921 to 1935.  Then the size of the Bolsa (assuming the stocks held their value at par) 
would have been 300 million paper pesos larger, or roughly larger by 30 percent.  
Rates of Return on Equity 
Dividend-price ratio.   One measure of the expected return to stocks is the dividend-price 
ratio.  If price movements are difficult to forecast, as one expects on an equity market, 
movements in the dividend-price ratio may reflect changing ex ante returns to the market.  In this 
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pesos. respect, there do not appear to have been enormous changes in the ex ante returns on the 
Argentine Bolsa.  Table 3 reports dividend-price ratios for a group of common stocks with 
nominal capitalizations in excess of 10 million paper pesos.  Generally speaking, these represent 
the bulk of the Bolsa’s market capitalization.   
In the period from 1900 to 1905, dividend-price ratios were low, and stock prices rose 
rapidly.  Thus it appears that in this period the exchange was dominated by stocks whose prices 
were expected to appreciate, and did so.   This seems generally appropriate for an era that ex post 
was one of spectacular growth. For much of the rest of the period, dividend-price ratios are 
relatively higher around 6 percent, until the bear market of the 1930s, and dividends rather than 
capital gains bulk large in the ex post returns to the stocks.  Returns are strong in the 1920s, and 
then weaken in the early 1930s, with a bear market that extends from 1928 to 1934.  The low 
dividend-price ratios in the early 1930s suggest that during this period, investors remained 
hopeful of a return to higher prices.   
Price indexes.  Table 4 and Figure 1 show Argentine stock prices based on continuously 
traded stocks. From 1906 to 1912, in the Belle Epoque, the real value of shares on the Argentine 
stock market was roughly stable. After 1912, however, the stock market dropped for two years 
and continued to sink until 1920.  Beginning in 1920, however, the stock market stabilized and 
then rallied spiritedly from 1925 to 1928, and in 1930, the stock market was still well above its 
level in the first half of the decade.    
Figure 1 shows that bank and nonbank stock prices showed broadly similar secular and 
cyclical movements, but after the 1920s, the bank stock prices are less volatile, and there seems 
to be relatively little secular movement.  This quieter behavior of bank stocks reflects a period in 
which the private banks are not particularly robust.   
 20Thus from a high plateau around 1910, bank stocks and nonbank stocks alike fall during 
the great liquidity crunch and recession of 1912 to 1914.  Both series rise but while nonbank 
stocks rise above their 1910 level, bank stock prices on average manage only to rise to about 
four-fifths of their peak.  The divergent path of bank stocks will be discussed further below. 
Real rates of return.  Prior to the 1930s, real rates of return on Argentina’s Bolsa are 
generally quite strong.  The periodization here has been chosen to match that in a careful study of 
international equity returns by Dimson et al. (2000).  Table 5 shows that for our Argentine 
stocks, real returns are above those in the US from 1900 to 1920, and then falter relatively in the 
1920s.  At least until 1929, then, stock market real returns do not appear to be the reason for the 
weak turnover and declining initial offerings.   
In summary, where the New York Stock Exchange continues to strengthen and provide 
substantial finance as the 1920s develop, the Buenos Aires Bolsa falters as a source of capital 
during this period.  Nevertheless, for much of the period under consideration, the Bolsa is a 
surprisingly strong source of capital funding and of good dividends. 
 
Section IV. Banking Development and Banking Crises 
  Measuring Argentine banking development during the period 1900 to 1935 depends in 
large part on how one conceives of banking development.  We shall show that Argentine banking 
development in the aggregate from 1900 to 1935 was quite substantial, but took place with a 
highly significant drawback  the steadily increasing importance of the BNA.   
  Bank loans.  As shown in Table 6 and Figure 2, the ratio of bank loans to GDP in 
Argentina rises steadily for most of the period beginning around 20 percent in the early 1900s, 
rising to over 40 percent in 1922, and thereafter remaining above 35 percent until 1935.  On 
 21average, over the period 1901 to 1935, bank loans average 32.8 percent of Argentine GDP.  Over 
the same period, US bank loans average 39 percent of GDP.  For a somewhat shorter period, 
from 1921 to 1935, loans at London clearing banks average 33.1 percent of UK GDP.
6  Focusing 
on the period after World War I but before the Depression, from 1921 to 1929 Argentine banks 
lend an average of 37 percent of GDP, US banks 39 percent, and London clearing banks 34 
percent. Thus, overall, banks in Argentina mobilized a large proportion of domestic funds 
compared to two of the best developed banking systems in the world.  
  However, as documented in della Paolera and Taylor (1998, 1999), the Argentine 
banking system during this period had an increasingly lopsided development, as the huge BNA 
grew much more rapidly than either private domestic or foreign banks.  The relatively slow 
growth of private domestic banking during this period can in part be ascribed to the boom of 
1910 to 1912 and the crash that succeeded it, as we shall show below.   
In turn, the lopsided development of the Argentine banking system made the political 
capture of the financial system increasingly inviting, and the bailout of the Argentine private 
banks in 1935 documented in della Paolera and Taylor, 1999, was one of the outcomes.  
Monetary development.  Another measure of financial development is money.  A measure 
that is often used for international comparisons is M3: currency in circulation plus deposits at all 
financial intermediaries.  This measure has two virtues: one, it is available for more countries, 
and two, by broadly defining depositories, it makes minor institutional differences between 
countries less important.   
During the period under consideration, 1901 to 1935, the ratio of M3 to GDP for 
Argentina was 45.0 percent (Table 6 and Figure 3). Over the same period, the ratio for the US 
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6 During this period, London clearing banks account for 77 percent of gross bank deposits in the UK.   was 55.5 percent and for the UK 58.5 percent.  Thus on average, broad money in proportion to 
GDP was lower for Argentina than for the US, at a ratio of .82, and the UK, at a ratio of .77. 
All three countries saw their ratios of M3 to GDP grow over the period, and broadly 
speaking, at about the same rate, at nearly a percent a year. In the decade from 1901 to 1910 
Argentina had a M3/GDP ratio of 41 percent, while in the decade ending in 1935 it had a ratio of 
49 percent.  For the US, the comparable figures are 50.2 percent and 62.8 percent.  And for the 
UK, they are 54.4 percent and 65.5 percent.  
Argentine Private National Banks 
  The Argentine private banks (bancos privados nacionales) proved their mettle as early as 
the Baring crisis.  In that crisis, when both the national bank and the provincial bank of Buenos 
Aires failed, a number of private banks weathered the storm.  But almost all of them were forced 
to suspend, at least briefly, during that period. Alone among domestic private banks,
7 Banco 
Espanol del Rio de la Plata had managed to keep its doors open throughout the crisis, relying on 
a high reserve-to-deposit ratio, greater than 50 percent. Although founded just four years before 
the Baring crisis, the Banco Espanol was soon able to replace Banco de Italia y Rio de la Plata as 
the top private bank as the result of the reputation it had won with its conservative investment 
strategy. 
  The period from 1900 to 1912 was a heady period for Argentine’s financial community, 
as the economy flowered and deposits rose rapidly.  Deposits and loans of the private banks grew 
faster than GDP, indeed, their ratios to GDP roughly doubled.  And they grew relative to 
deposits and loans of the BNA.  They may have grown too fast.  Private banks used both security 
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7 The British Bank of London and the River Plate was the other private bank that did not suspend.   issues and deposits to grow, and while they generally used conservative banking principles, 
reserves did shrink somewhat relative to deposits.   
From 1900 to 1914, the Belle Epoque, Argentina had generally benefited from rising 
world prices, and Argentine export prices rose faster than import prices, so there was a favorable 
terms of trade effect. This boom time for Argentina was perhaps comparable to the boom in 
Southeast Asia in the 1990s.  As we shall see, weakness within the Argentine financial structure 
appeared well before the London stock exchange holiday.  
In London, the bank rate was raised in late 1912, and monetary pressure was not relaxed 
until early 1914. The 1912-13 crop in Argentina was excellent.  Yet bank stocks and dividends 
appeared to be already under pressure.   
In the first quarter of 1913, gold continued to be imported into Argentina at a phenomenal 
rate (35 million gold pesos), and in the second quarter (10 million), gold was still being imported 
at the rate of the previous year.  But in the second half of the year, 42 million gold pesos were 
exported.   
The 1913-14 crop did very poorly.  Cereal exports for October 1913 to September 1914 
fall to 182 million gold pesos from 322 in 1912-13.  By June 1914, a generalized depression had 
resulted. Agricultural production had only one good year in the next three – 1914-15, and does 
not fully recover until 1917-18. The nonagricultural sector’s production fell 15 percent from 
1913 to 1914, and another 10 percent from 1914 to 1915.  In all, from 1912 to 1917, Argentina’s 
real gross domestic product slid 19 percent while population rose nearly 14 percent.   Output per 
capita thus fell nearly 29 percent, with consequences that have reverberated throughout the 
century.  
 24Beginning in 1912, the disturbances of the domestic economy began to lead to 
widespread withdrawals of cash from the private banks, some of it in favor of the Bank of the 
Nation ,which was clearly perceived as a safe haven.  
The closure of the London stock exchange on Friday, July 31, 1914, in retrospect put a 
definite period on the Belle Epoque, marking as it did the transfer of international financial 
leadership from London to New York. June 27, 1914, was the date of the assassination of 
Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo, the spark that set off the war. The outbreak of war during the 
following month was accompanied by a desperate flight to liquidity, as foreign investors sold 
securities at exchanges around the world.  In particular, many investors were afraid that they 
would not be able to liquidate and repatriate overseas assets as the war widened.  They thus 
dumped assets on markets and withdrew liquidity, causing prices to tumble.  This in turn 
threatened many institutions, particularly financial ones, with failure.  In addition, the warring 
nations themselves had a sudden pressing need to finance purchases of war materiel and the 
raising of armies.  These rising pressures, over the course of July 1914, forced one exchange 
after another to close – most for extended periods.  The world’s major bond exchanges remained 
closed until the end of the year. 
These liquidity needs naturally transmitted themselves to the Argentine markets, in 
particular, to the private banks.  The most important private banks – Banco Espanol, Banco 
Italia, Banco Frances, and Nuevo Banco Italiano – were each identified with and dependent on 
immigrant communities that maintained strong ties with their homelands. As their depositors 
were naturally responsive to European calls for liquidity, these banks were subject to 
extraordinary demands on liquidity.   
 25In Diamond and Dybvig’s model of a bank run, depositors hold liquid deposits because 
they expect to receive new information about the marginal utility of consumption.  The events 
during 1914 appear to closely match this description of the demand for liquidity.  Total deposits 
at Argentine banks fell by nearly 20 percent.  The brunt of the hardship fell on the private banks, 
which lost over 45 percent of their deposits.  It is useful to compare these losses with those in the 
US during the banking panics of the Great Depression, where between the end of 1928 and the 
middle of 1933, commercial bank deposits fell by 39.5 percent.  Thus the Argentine private 
banks experienced a worse deposit loss in two years than US commercial banks did in the four 
and a half years of the Great Depression. 
As Table 7 shows, deposits at the five largest private banks fell by two-fifths.  (Only 
Banco Popular, the smallest of the five, had a deposit loss less than 20 percent.)  It is remarkable 
that these banks could survive such intense drains.  However, it was not just a demand for 
liquidity that propelled the deposit losses.  For, as della Paolera and Taylor, 1999, point out, the 
BNA actually gained deposits.  On the one hand, then, a question arises as to whether the boom 
years from 1900 to 1912 had not themselves led the private banks to overextend.  On the other 
hand, it could well be that some of the drain on deposits was due to contagious fears and a flight 
to safety that could have been stemmed by deposit insurance.  Although the BNA, by 
rediscounting to the private banks, helped them weather the crisis, the BNA may also have, by 
representing a safe haven, encouraged flight.   
One interpretation is that the banking crisis in this period was due to the end of London’s 
role as financier to the world in general and Argentina in particular.  An alternative interpretation 
argues that the extended boom from 1900 to 1912 had generated speculative conditions in 
Argentina that were in any case liable to cause the domestic financial structure to fall.   This 
 26latter interpretation is close to that put forward in Ford’s study of the crisis.   We turn to detailed 
banking price data to shed additional light on this issue.   
 
The Stock Market as a Window on Private Banks 
  Detailed analysis of stock price movements offers a window on the public’s view of the 
business prospects of some of the major Argentine private banks.  We review some of the 
evidence below that shows significant stock price declines at the banks before the deep liquidity 
squeeze that took place beginning in June 1914. 
Nuevo Banco Italiano, the fourth largest private bank, had a stock price of 106 in 
December 1899.   The stock price hit a high of 420 in October 1912, but in January 1913, it fell 
to 325, stabilized to 305 in November, fell in February 1914 to 250.  It then steadied during 
1914, to 270 in September, before falling to 165 in January 1915. NBI’s stock had a pattern of 
falling around year-end during this period.  For this bank there appears to have been an important 
impact on its stock market value by the spring of 1914. 
For Banco de Galicia, a medium size private bank,  our data begin with the stock trading 
at 138 in 1910.  The price briefly shot up to 160 in January 1911, was still 160 in March 1911, 
fell back to 135 in April 1911, and is still 128 in January 1913.  Over the course of the year it fell 
steadily to 85 in December 1913, then to 40 in September 1914, before recovering to 60 in 
December 1914.  When the generalized depression struck in July 1914, the Banco de Galicia’s 
stock price had already fallen to 48.  
Banco Frances del Rio de la Plata was a large, forward-thinking bank that invested in 
industry – electricity, rails, and food manufacture – and came a cropper.  Its shares peaked in 
1911 at 175.  The price fell steadily to 134 in December 1913, by which time it had lost  nearly 
 27one-quarter of its nominal value.  In February 1914, the stock traded at 112.5, and on the eve of 
war in June 1914, it had fallen to 92.  But its true financial condition was revealed in the August-
September hiatus, and when the Bolsa reopened in October 1914, the price was 37 and its group 
was ruined as a financial force. 
Banco Español stock price, which we first record at 128 in 1899, continued to do well 
throughout the 1912-13 crisis and did not begin to fall until 1914 opened.  From 180 in February 
1914, the stock price fell to 150 in July and was next traded at 100 in October.  Thus the fall of 
Banco Español’s stock price followed the agriculture failure and the generalized depression; the 
gold export in the second half of 1913 did not appear to be so important.  
However, a decade later it was learned that Banco Español had, beginning in 1914, 
entered into a policy of deception to avoid closing.  The Economist of March 24, 1924, reported: 
“It is now public property that the Banco Español del Rio de la Plata has, at an 
extraordinary general meeting, held on February 2
nd, written down ts capital by 75 percent – 
from $100 million Arg. paper to $25 million – and admitted losses which at the lowest reckoning 
total $103 million Arg. paper, and are generally believed to be in effect nearly thirty million 
more than this sum.   
“… As far back as 1914 the bank, taking the view that to suspend the dividend would 
have led to closing down, decided to pay dividends out of ‘funds other than profits,’ i.e., 
presumably out of capital.” 
The capital loss of about 100 million paper pesos represented roughly one-third of the 
paid in capital of the private national banks as a group.   
Thus it would appear that even before the end of the Belle Epoque, the boom of that 
period had resulted in excesses that had severely harmed the major private banks in the domestic 
 28banking system.  The picture that emerges is one not dissimilar to events in Southeast Asia, 
where lack of financial controls during an economic boom inspired in large part by financial 
openness created banking sector weaknesses with dire economic consequences.   
  One consequence may have been that whereas the US was able to ship industrial and 
military supplies to Europe and take advantage of the war boom, a similar growth in the 
industrial sector in Argentina was difficult to finance.  Moreover, it is not clear how soundly 
banks were operating.  In its report on the revelations at the Banco Espanol, The Economist notes 
that, “in 1918, the bank indulged in the purchase of ships (trying by hook or by crook to obtain 
the necessary profits.)  But the Armistice came along, and the only result of the shipping 
speculation was a further loss of $3 million m/n.” 
  Banco Espanol shares had gone from 100 in October 1914 and 120 in January 1915 to 
153 in December 1918.   Some of the loss on the ships may have been reflected in its shares 
which declined from 141 in August 1919 to 107 in January 1920.  In the period surrounding the 
shareholders’ meeting at which its losses were announced, in February 1924, Banco Espanol’s 
shares fall from 93 in September 1923 to 26.5 in January 1924 as the news leaked out, and then 
further to 16 in July 1924.  It drifts up to 20.5 in January 1925 and then jumps abruptly to 72 in 
February 1925; it then stays at that level until 1930.  
After 1923, as we saw in the previous section, stock market development tapered off, 
with fewer initial offerings and a lower rate of turnover.  This relative decline coincided with the 
revelation that Banco Espanol had hidden losses for over a decade, amid tremendous losses for 
shareholders.  Did the revelations about Banco Espanol and the resulting increase in uncertainty 
about shareholdings generally have a role in the deterioration of the stock market’s 
development?  Certainly the fact that both Banco Espanol and Banco Frances were ruined (one 
 29publicly, the other to limp along with chicanery) at the end of the Belle Epoque had important 
long-run consequences for the Argentine economy. 
  The melancholy demise of the BNA in 1935 detailed in della Paolera and Taylor (1999) 
was due to bad loans arising predominantly in the private banking system.  They calculate that 
one-third of all private banking loans had gone bad by then.  By the end, with the Caja 
rediscounting to the BNA and the latter rediscounting on the collateral of bad loans, there was 
simply no control in Argentine’s system of credit allocation.   
  Our analysis of bank stock prices suggests that the weakness in private banking arose in 
large part from the excesses of the Belle Epoque, antedating the severe international financial 
crisis touched off by the sudden start of World War I.  Inadequate development of the institutions 
for providing private credit must have been an important limitation to the Argentina’s economic 
development during this period.  The creation of two durable institutions for maintaining the 
currency system was inadequate to the development of a sound financial regime.   
 
Conclusion 
  The failure of most developing countries to attain high levels of per capita output during 
the 20th century is one of the most important questions for economics.  One important cause of 
development failure is, no doubt, a failure of openness – countries that cut themselves off from 
world trade are unlikely to capture the benefits of technological progress abroad.   
  But an open financial regime is not a guarantee of domestic financial development, since 
the progress of domestic financial institutions is by no means automatic.  The traumatic events in 
Argentina associated with the close of the Belle Epoque certainly warped its financial 
development.   Despite a large stock market capitalization, good international credit, large gold 
 30reserves, a strong money supply, and apparently abundant bank credit, a careful study of the 
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TABLE 1  INTEREST RATES AND GOLD  
 ANNUAL AVERAGE INTEREST 
RATES 
ARGENTINA'S MONETARY GOLD 
    





(percent of gold at world central banks and 
treasuries) 
1900 5.4  2.8  3.3   
1901 5.2  2.9  3.25   
1902 5.2  2.9  3.3   
1903 5  2.8  3.45   
1904 4.9  2.8  3.6   
1905 4.9  2.8  3.5   
1906 4.9  2.8  3.55   
1907 4.9  3  3.8   
1908 4.8  2.9  3.95   
1909 4.8  3  3.82   
1910 4.8  3.1  3.87   
1911 4.8  3.2  3.94   
1912 4.8  3.3  3.91   
1913 4.9  3.4  4.02  5.27% 
1914 4.9  3.3  4.16  4.52% 
1915 5.1  3.8  4.2  3.83% 
1916 5.3  4.3  4.05  4.00% 
1917 5.3  4.6  4.05  4.03% 
1918 5.1  4.4  4.82  4.47% 
1919 5.3  4.6  4.81  4.95% 
1920 5.6  5.3  5.17  6.53% 
1921 5.4  5.2  5.31  5.87% 
1922 5  4.4  4.85  5.61% 
1923 5  4.3  4.68  5.39% 
1924 5  4.4  4.69  4.94% 
1925 5  4.4  4.5  5.01% 
1926 5  4.6  4.4  4.88% 
1927 4.9  4.6  4.3  5.52% 
1928 4.9  4.5  4.05  6.04% 
1929 5.3  4.6  4.45  4.20% 
1930 5.7  4.5  4.4  3.76% 
1931 7  4.4  4.1  2.23% 
1932 9.05*  3.7  4.7  2.08% 
1933 4.9*  3.4  4.11  1.99% 
1934 4.3*  3.1  3.91   
1935 4*  2.9  3.37   
  
Sources: Column 1: see text; Columns 2: Mitchell and Deane; Column 3: US Historical Statistics; Column 4: Federal 






TABLE 2  STOCK MARKET TRANSACTIONS AND NEW ISSUES     
      
 Buenos Aires Bolsa  Capitalization of New Issues/GDP     
 Transactions/GDP     
1900    Buenos Aires Bolsa  New York Stock 
Exchange 
 
1901 0.47%     
1902 0.49%     
1903 0.94%     
1904 3.14%  0.10%    
1905 2.08%  NA     
1906 2.09%  NA     
1907 0.96%  0.09%    
1908   0.32%    
1909   0.58%    
1910   1.25%    
1911   0.75%    
1912 0.66%  0.72%    
1913 0.88%  0.56%    
1914 0.20%  0.54%    
1915 0.19%  0.13%    
1916 0.23%  0.94%    
1917 0.47%  0.38%    
1918 0.89%  0.74%    
1919 0.71%  0.21% 0.98%    
1920 0.37%  0.62% 0.64%    
1921 0.59%  0.74% 0.27%    
1922 0.66%  0.44% 0.39%    
1923 0.53%  0.45% 0.38%    
1924 0.29%  0.22% 0.59%    
1925 0.21%  0.16% 0.67%    
1926 0.31%  0.22% 0.69%    
1927 0.48%  0.35% 0.71%    
1928 0.38%  0.26% 2.15%    
1929 0.41%  0.13% 4.88%    
1930 0.27%  0.19% 1.21%    
1931   0.32% 0.25%    
1932   0.13% 0.02%    
1933   0.15% 0.24%    
1934   0.04% 0.05%    
1935   0.08% 0.04%    
   Average,  1907-1935 0.40%    
   Average,  1919-1935 0.28% 0.83%    
   Average,  1907-1923 0.56%    
      
GDP data: Table 6    
Argentine Source: Stock market data, El Monitor de Sociedades Anonimas y Patentes de Invencion;GDP, 
Taylor (this volume) 
US Source: Stock market data: U.S. Historical Statistics  GDP, Balke and Gordon, 1989, before 1929, US NIA 
afterwards. 
 37TABLE 3  ARGENTINE EQUITIES   
 FREQUENTLY TRADED STOCKS   
 AVERAGE DIVIDEND PRICE RATIO  AVERAGE TOTAL RETURNS 
 Nominal  Real 
1900 4.2% 22.4%  8.6%     
1901 4.1% -0.2%  13.4%     
1902 4.6% 4.7%  -4.1%     
1903 6.2% 38.1%  45.7%     
1904 4.4% 14.4%  12.0%     
1905 6.5% 24.2%  14.3%     
1906 5.9% -1.1%  -6.7%     
1907 8.2% 5.6%  2.8%     
1908 7.3% 12.3%  16.6%     
1909 6.8% 25.3%  14.5%     
1910 6.6% 29.9%  20.5%     
1911 6.9% 18.6%  19.6%     
1912 5.8% 10.9%  8.2%     
1913 8.3% -16.0%  -16.0%     
1914 6.2% -12.5%  -13.1%     
1915 7.2% 1.8%  -4.9%     
1916 5.3% 11.7%  -1.9%     
1917 2.5% 19.6%  -3.8%     
1918 11.0% 44.6%  32.3%     
1919 6.3% 18.9%  15.1%     
1920 9.6% 7.2%  2.5%     
1921 7.3% -5.0%  19.5%     
1922 7.4% 10.6%  22.0%     
1923 6.4% 9.0%  4.5%     
1924 6.7% 5.0%  -1.9%     
1925 7.0% 5.2%  3.5%     
1926 6.8% 15.0%  28.1%     
1927 6.6% 14.1%  16.2%     
1928 5.5% 12.5%  11.8%     
1929 5.7% 1.2%  4.4%     
1930 5.3% -8.3%  -4.1%     
1931 6.3% -11.0%  -8.3%     
1932 5.7% -10.7%  -11.8%     
1933 4.9% 10.6%  15.7%     
1934 4.4% -1.9%  -13.9%     
1935 5.5% 1.6%  2.8%     
1900 to 1909  5.8%  13.9%  10.9%     
1910 to 1919  6.6%  11.4%  4.5%     
1920 to 1929  6.9%  7.3%  10.7%     
1930 to 1935  5.4%  -4.0%  -3.7%     
Source: See text.  Real returns deflated using wholesale price indexes from della Paolera, 1988, and Domenech, 1986. 
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TABLE 4  STOCK PRICE INDICES - BANKS AND 
NON-BANK FIRMS 




1899Q4 100 100  100
1900Q1 101.2835 106.4267  97.00855
1900Q2 105.1342 109.7686  101.2821
1900Q3 110.5018 120.0514  102.5641
1900Q4 117.5029 130.3342  106.8376
1901Q1 111.4819 123.2391  101.7094
1901Q2 113.8856 127.5064  102.5641
1901Q3 114.2357 127.7635  102.9915
1901Q4 112.6021 127.7635  100
1902Q1 108.7515 125.7069  94.65812
1902Q2 107.5846 116.7095  100
1902Q3 108.3314 121.1825  97.64957
1902Q4 112.7188 123.9075  103.4188
1903Q1 119.9533 134.1902  108.1197
1903Q2 132.2054 152.4422  115.3846
1903Q3 140.8868 169.7686  116.8803
1903Q4 146.5578 174.8072  123.0769
1904Q1 140.9568 173.2648  114.1026
1904Q2 163.8273 214.3959  121.7949
1904Q3 151.2252 189.2031  119.6581
1904Q4 160.6768 205.9126  123.0769
1905Q1 160.6768 205.9126  123.0769
1905Q2 160.6768 205.9126  123.0769
1905Q3 186.1144  244.473  137.6068
1905Q4 187.3979 242.6735 141.453
1906Q1 185.4142 238.3033 141.453
1906Q2 183.6173 237.4293  138.8889
1906Q3 186.6278 244.0617  138.8889
1906Q4 175.0292  218.509  138.8889
1907Q1 171.2952 217.9949  132.4786
1907Q2 172.112  212.0823  138.8889
1907Q3 169.3349  205.964  138.8889
1907Q4 170.83  209.00  139.10 
1908Q1 175.4726 213.3162  144.0171
1908Q2 177.8063 214.2416  147.5214
1908Q3 168.7748 194.9614  147.0085
1908Q4 178.8098 202.1594  159.4017
1909Q1 188.8915 217.1722  165.3846
1909Q2 201.5636 223.4961  183.3333
1909Q3 210.5718 238.9717  186.9658
1909Q4 209.8716 233.3162  190.3846
1910Q1 238.0397 281.2339  202.1368
1910Q2 250.1274 284.0377  224.3387
1910Q3 267.7169 314.4009  229.3092
1910Q4 235.4563 263.3282  215.3916
1911Q1 240.4796 268.2666  220.6936
1911Q2 251.0205 288.8486  221.1906
1911Q3 248.15  285.0254  219.2024
1911Q4 261.3062 313.6999  216.7171
1912Q1 259.5361 304.9064  222.1847
1912Q2 268.578  313.5725  231.9602 40
1912Q3 275.9136 314.2097  246.5406
1912Q4 273.7289 312.3936  243.8896
1913Q1 254.9912 303.7913  213.9004
1913Q2 251.164  299.1715  210.7524
1913Q3 217.6755  243.734 198.823
1913Q4 212.413  241.5037  190.2074
1914Q1 194.3132  229.556  165.0231
1914Q2 190.3265 226.6885  159.7212
1914Q3 181.2367 215.5373 152.431
1914Q4 174.7782 209.3245  133.7025
1915Q1 156.2798 205.5012  111.0095
1915Q2 159.7084 200.2442  123.6017
1915Q3 163.7749 217.9268  113.6605
1915Q4 166.9643 220.4757 117.637
1916Q1 186.26  241.8223  135.531
1916Q2 180.9178 230.6711  136.0281
1916Q3 176.054  224.6176  132.2173
1916Q4 176.0859 225.9557  130.8918
1917Q1 177.25  230.8304  128.2409
1917Q2 175.3523 226.4018  128.9036
1917Q3 191.666  255.4268  132.615
1917Q4 208.0435 276.1044  145.1408
1918Q1 215.698  286.2998  150.4428
1918Q2 241.4683 308.7934  180.5976
1918Q3 264.2564 354.0037 180.929
1918Q4 267.5893 352.0602 189.876
1919Q1 267.4777 354.7046  186.8937
1919Q2 276.2246 375.6848  183.2486
1919Q3 282.117  389.0504  181.5917
1919Q4 284.2538 404.9488  169.4966
1920Q1 277.8432 397.8758  163.5319
1920Q2 291.302  420.0467  166.0891
1920Q3 286.6763 412.8498 164.427
1920Q4 228.8074 313.5155  160.8469
1921Q1 209.3928 280.7149  158.6733
1921Q2 209.5507 280.9912  158.6733
1921Q3 203.808  267.4883  165.0663
1921Q4 201.5701 263.0887  165.9613
1922Q1 196.2142 254.8902  163.7877
1922Q2 205.1302 264.8292  174.2721
1922Q3 205.6393 265.0295  175.5507
1922Q4 207.889 271.591  170.6921
1923Q1 211.0702 275.4588  173.8374
1923Q2 214.8158 280.1209  177.3407
1923Q3 214.4961 282.3242  172.2264
1923Q4 212.1911 287.5458  155.0932
1924Q1 207.5535 283.3257 147.882
1924Q2 212.3806 289.2587  152.5361
1924Q3 211.2518 288.0431  151.1296
1924Q4 212.7516 290.4605  151.5132
1925Q1 218.5929 295.5992  160.9236
1925Q2 215.471  289.4176  162.2534
1925Q3 220.4479 298.5415  161.4862
1925Q4 217.5233 293.6584  161.0515
1926Q1 221.8688 302.5475  158.67331926Q2 228.9376 315.4702  157.6504
1926Q3 228.1364 313.7228  158.2897
1926Q4 232.9003 320.4155  161.3328
1927Q1 237.1668 325.6785  165.4115
1927Q2 247.9497 343.7675  166.8563
1927Q3 249.3508 348.3606  162.8927
1927Q4 252.4451 353.6305  163.1612
1928Q1 255.9223 359.3494  163.8388
1928Q2 260.8204 361.9671  174.8603
1928Q3 261.2861 362.7959  174.8347
1928Q4 259.4271 360.9241  172.2775
1929Q1 259.2456 360.1091  173.1981
1929Q2 254.2567  352.111  171.8428
1929Q3 254.0831 351.9591  171.5615
1929Q4 246.4578 340.3556  168.3395
1930Q1 220.3966 297.9682  162.3812
1930Q2 217.4089 292.7536  162.3556
1930Q3 215.321  289.4866  161.6396
1930Q4 205.7893 275.1549  157.2924
1931Q1 190.0374 250.2005  152.4593
1931Q2 180.4702 234.7292  150.1067
1931Q3 169.1624 214.8305  150.3113
1931Q4 163.846  206.1901  149.0839
1932Q1 152.6567 190.8362  141.2589
1932Q2 146.6811 180.8489  140.3894
1932Q3 140.8121  173.203  135.5308
1932Q4 134.1064 162.9877  132.7179
1933Q1 128.4782 153.6359  131.7973
1933Q2 124.3932 155.3833 115.329
1933Q3 128.9124 164.8802  112.3883
1933Q4 136.0759  178.024  111.2631
1934Q1 140.7608 187.1341  109.5754
1934Q2 132.8395 172.3742  111.2375
1934Q3 131.0042 168.2922  112.8486
1934Q4 127.5152 162.7529  111.8001
1935Q1 122.1553 157.5037  104.1541
1935Q2 124.0261 159.7139  106.1232
1935Q3 121.5554 156.7578  103.5915
1935Q4 119.3057 156.3572  97.04515
   







 41TABLE 5  REAL EQUITY RATES OF RETURN, SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
 
Jan1 to Jan 1 Argentina  US  UK  Australia Canada France Germany Italy  Netherlands Sweden 
1900 to 1910  10.9%  7.1%  1.8% 11.8% 6.3% 5.3% 3.6% 4.4%  4.8% 19.1%
1910 to 1920  4.5%  -2.5%  -1.4% 3.9% 0.1% -3.1% -12.7% -2.8%  1.3% 0.7%
1920 to 1930  10.7% 14.9%  9.3% 16.3% 15.5% 7.9% 13.6% 2.4%  1.5% 8.4%
      






















 42TABLE 6   CREDIT SUPPLY AND 
MONEY SUPPLY 
(PERCENT OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT) 
 BANK LOANS   BROAD MONEY SUPPLY 











1901 26.9%  7.7%  7.8%  11.4% 33.0%   38.5%  45.8%  55.4% 
1902 19.0%  7.6%  6.4%  5.0%  35.4%   36.9%  48.1%  55.4% 
1903 20.3%  9.2%  6.6%  4.5%  36.1%   41.8%  48.3%  55.8% 
1904 23.6%  10.3%  8.1%  5.1%  35.7%   43.8%  48.4%  55.4% 
1905 26.2%  11.4%  7.9%  6.9%  36.5%   43.7%  49.0%  53.9% 
1906 26.5%  11.3%  8.6%  6.6%  37.2%   40.9%  49.0%  52.4% 
1907 26.1%  11.3%  7.9%  6.9%  39.2%   39.7%  48.7%  51.4% 
1908 26.8%  11.8%  7.2%  7.8%  40.3%   39.4%  56.3%  54.4% 
1909 28.1%  13.2%  6.9%  8.1%  38.6%   42.0%  54.3%  55.2% 
1910 30.5%  15.3%  6.7%  8.5%  40.9%   42.2%  53.9%  54.5% 
1911 35.1%  18.2%  7.4%  9.5%  41.1%   44.3%  55.8%  53.2% 
1912 34.4%  17.8%  7.1%  9.5%  40.5%   42.0%  54.6%  51.9% 
1913 35.9%  18.0%  7.4%  10.5% 40.5%   43.9%  53.7%  52.2% 
1914 35.1%  15.5%  6.9%  12.7% 45.3%   43.2%  59.1%  55.5% 
1915 29.2%  11.9%  5.5%  11.8% 43.9%   41.2%  63.4%  55.4% 
1916 27.8%  12.0%  5.6%  10.1% 39.7%   40.8%  58.4%  51.4% 
1917 27.4%  11.9%  5.5%  10.0% 37.9%   40.8%  54.9%  46.1% 
1918 28.5%  11.2%  5.8%  11.5% 32.8%   40.8%  48.2%  45.8% 
1919 32.4%  11.8%  7.2%  13.4% 32.5%   43.6%  50.0%  53.3% 
1920 32.5%  12.1%  7.3%  13.1% 35.8%   44.6%  45.9%  54.9% 
1921 39.5%  15.6%  9.1%  14.7% 39.9% 28.9% 54.0%  51.3%  65.1% 
1922 40.4%  15.6%  8.2%  16.5% 38.4% 28.2% 55.0%  57.2%  69.1% 
1923 37.8%  14.0%  8.2%  15.6% 35.9% 30.8% 50.0%  50.9%  67.6% 
1924 34.6%  11.8%  7.0%  15.8% 36.4% 33.0% 44.3%  53.4%  65.1% 
1925 35.1%  12.5%  7.0%  15.6% 37.6% 35.2% 44.7%  55.1%  60.6% 
1926 38.0%  13.3%  7.1%  17.6% 37.6% 36.9% 48.1%  52.2%  63.8% 
1927 35.8%  12.5%  6.6%  16.7% 39.4% 37.8% 47.6%  55.4%  61.1% 
1928 34.0%  12.0%  6.2%  15.9% 41.0% 38.0% 48.6%  57.0%  61.8% 
1929 37.1%  13.4%  7.0%  16.7% 40.4% 39.0% 49.7%  52.9%  60.9% 
1930 42.4%  14.4%  8.2%  19.8% 44.9% 37.8% 52.8%  58.8%  61.6% 
1931 47.6%  15.9%  8.7%  23.1% 46.2% 36.4% 55.6%  62.5%  66.7% 
1932 45.4%  15.4%  6.9%  23.1% 47.7% 32.8% 53.8%  76.2%  69.4% 
1933 43.6%  14.8%  6.1%  22.6% 39.6% 27.2% 53.2%  73.7%  73.6% 
1934 35.6%  12.2%  4.9%  18.5% 32.3% 27.7% 43.3%  69.6%  67.6% 
1935 29.1%  11.1%  4.6%  13.4% 27.6% 26.8% 41.7%  70.1%  68.5% 
AVERAGE, 1901-35  32.8%  13.0%  7.0% 12.8% 38.5%    45.0%  55.5%  58.5% 
AVERAGE, 1921-29  36.9%  13.4%  7.4%  16.1% 38.5% 34.2% 49.5%  54.4%  63.7% 
      
Argentine Sources: Loans, Baiocco; Money, della Paolera, and Baiocco; GDP, Taylor (this volume) 
US Sources: Loans, Federal Reserve, 1958; Money, Friedman and Schwartz, 1970; GDP, Balke and 
Gordon, 1989, before 1929, US NIA afterwards. 
UK Sources: Loans, Mitchell and Deane, 1962; Money, Capie and Webber, 1985; GDP, Feinstein, 1972. 
 43TABLE 7  DEPOSITS IN THE 1912-1914 CRISIS   
 Deposits  (Millions of paper pesos,end of year) 
 1912 1914 Decline   
Total 1480.9 1189.3 -19.7%  
Private Domestic Banks  674.3 365.4 -45.8%  
Banco Espanol  229.9 126.9 -44.8%  
Banco Italia  101.5 62.4 -38.5%  
Banco Frances  84.7 55 -35.1%  
Nuevo Banco Italiano  41 27.2 -33.7%  
Banco Popular Argentina  20.4 17.4 -14.7%  
Other Private Banks  196.8 76.5 -61.1%  
Banco de la Nacion  478.3 552.7 15.6%  
Foreign Banks  328.3 271.2 -17.4%  
  




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ARGENTINA ALL BANKS ARGENTINA PRIVATE BANKS ARGENTINA FOREIGN BANK

























































































































































































Argentina M3/GDP US M3/GDP UK M3/GDP
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